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ABSTRACT 
 
Clearly neither I nor anyone will ever read any substantial part of this massive tome 
so I will discuss the one article that interests me most and which I think provides 
the framework necessary for the understanding of all the rest. I refer to the one on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W). Even were I to try to discuss others, we would not get 
past the first page as all the issues here arise immediately in any discussion of 
behavior. The differentiation of pragmatics and semantics is largely meaningless. It 
is defensible that one might subtitle this work ‘Developments of Wittgenstein’s 
Contextualism’, but of course this term has inevitably been corrupted by 
philosophers. One might then say that pragmatics and semantics are parts of or 
coextensive with epistemology and ontology and the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought (Searle’s Logical Structure of Rationality) or that they describe 
how we use noises in specific contexts to give them meaning --i.e., a true or false 
(propositional) use which Searle calls their Conditions of Satisfaction. Adding the 
Wittgenstein/Searle work to modern research on thinking provides a framework for 
pragmatics, semantics and all other human behavior. 
 
Those who wish a more detailed exposition of the use of Wittgenstein and Searle in 
the description of behavior  and of a modern two systems approach to language 
and behavior may consult my book The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle  2nd ed 
(2019). 
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Clearly neither I nor anyone will ever read any substantial part of this massive tome 
so I will discuss the one article that interests me most and which I think provides 
the framework necessary for the understanding of all the rest. I refer to the one on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (W). Even were I to try to discuss others, we would not get 
past the first page as all the issues here arise immediately in any discussion of 
behavior. The article is more or less ok as far as it goes but, as with all discussion of 
W, in my view it does not go nearly far enough. I must apologize to those who may 
read some of my other reviews as they often repeat this framework, as it is essential 
and I cannot assume the reader is familiar with it. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now 
known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. 
Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive 
psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally 
ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those 
few who have understood him have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently but his work can be 
seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not see this. W analysts 
such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-
Sharrock do marvelously but stop short of putting him in the center of current 
psychology and linguistics, where he certainly belongs. It should also be clear that 
insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of higher order behavior (e.g., 
Pragmatics) are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into 
one another. Thus, not only Pragmatics, but such recently fashionable themes as 
“Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s 
work (and they do). 
 
The failure of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to 
the limited attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3rd period works have 
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received, but even more to the inability of most to understand how profoundly our 
view of philosophy (which I call the descriptive psychology of higher order thought-
DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in DPHOT --which Searle 
calls the logical structure of rationality- LSR), anthropology, sociology, politics, 
linguistics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature and all of animal 
behavior alters once we embrace the evolutionary framework. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default 
of the second self of slow thinking conscious System 2, which (without education) is 
oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast 
thinking axiomatic structure of System 1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). 
Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent article by noting that many logical 
features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because the 
creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the 
reflexes of S1) is not consciously experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century 
(PNC) p115- 117 and my review of it. 
 
Before remarking on this book, it is essential to grasp the W/S framework so I will 
first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), 
Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal- Sharrock(DMS) et. al. It will 
help to see my reviews of various books by Searle such as Philosophy in a New 
Century (PNC), and Making the Social World (MSW), the classics by W such as TLP, 
PI, and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of 
higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the 
Wittgenstein/Searle (W/S) framework. To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is 
not to imply that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only 
ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), 
that anyone accurately describing behavior (e.g., language) must be enunciating 
some variant or extension of what W said. Virtually everyone who discusses 
language thinks it essential to mention Pinker, Grice and Chomsky, but few realize 
W’s work was far broader and more penetrating. One would think that advanced 
studies of behavior would all begin with a broad general biologically founded 
 4 
 
framework for describing intentionality (higher order thought, language, 
descriptive psychology, thinking etc.) but sadly this is mistaken so I will first present 
what I consider the minimum essentials. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 from the less mechanical linguistic 
dispositional behavior of S2 and these in turn from the effects of culture (S3). To 
rephrase, all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast 
System 1 (S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work 
as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social behavior i.e., of 
‘we intentionality’, while the later W shows how S2 is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1, which in evolution and in each of our personal histories 
developed into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of psychology is 
not to be explained by calling it a "young science and that philosophers are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. He noted that this 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness. See Blue and Brown Books (BBB) p18. Another notable comment was that 
if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities of the mind lie open before us –
see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his nachlass demonstrated his famous 
dictum that the problem is not to find the solution but to recognize as the solution 
what appears to be only a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 
80 years ago that we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior 
and that these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125). 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: 
language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, speech) is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor’s LOT, 
Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language of Thought” of 
which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in action, that language is 
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not a picture of but is itself thinking or the mind, and his whole corpus can be 
regarded as the development of this idea. Many have deconstructed the idea of a 
‘language of thought’ but in my view, none better than W in BBB p37— “if we keep 
in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its 
object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all 
point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is 
just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” 
So, language issues direct from the brain and what could count as evidence for 
an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games (LG’s) 
did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes 
and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find 
a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the 
mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts 
(i.e., our speech using the later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--
the dispositions such as imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). 
Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the 
irrelevance of our mental life to the functioning of language, and the impossibility of 
private language.  The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary 
acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is 
Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical 
questions are here in our language   (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the 
answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop 
trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1—“the greatest danger  here is wanting to 
observe oneself”). 
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W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, 
PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and 
powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is 
provide the physical basis for our behavior, multiply our language games, and extend 
S2 into S3. The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) 
“bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and 
which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved 
and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers 
for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro 
intro. And the recent travesty by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that 
IF is the prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection. 
 
So, as W develops in ‘On Certainty’ (OC), most of our shared public experience 
(culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found 
mistaken without threatening our sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has 
profoundly different consequences from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely 
explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the 
skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) 
cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable propositions (as I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his 
work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 
that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and 
Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework over 
50 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the 
mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and over. One 
might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” 
(beware another network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds 
to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities 
or possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and propositional, 
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and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar mostly 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only 
sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic 
S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) 
by Searle or reflexive or intransitive in W’s BBB, and the S2 use, which is their normal 
use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict 
sense, and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms and 
much else here is my idea so don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my 
reviews on Amazon, ArXiv.org, ViXra.org, Academia.edu, Philpapers.org, 
ResearchGate.net, Citeseer, b-ok.org, libgen.io   etc.). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers or other behavioral scientists (e.g., 
linguists) the investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized 
psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under 
names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to 
use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did not use this 
terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional thinking only, since 
any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later 
Searle call our EP) which must feedback to S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by all 
discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms 
of our psychology are not evidential. As he famously said in OC 94 — “but I did not 
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get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it 
because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is the inherited background against 
which I distinguish between   true and false.” 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which typically give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2, 
which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by feedback into S1, causing actions. The general mechanism is via 
both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by   Searle 
`The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone 
familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When 
I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with 
or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other 
possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on W) – 
“It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet and like everything metaphysical, 
the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the 
language.” And one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated 
as EP or LSR (DPHOT) and that, in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing 
and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive   
psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning — “speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” -- which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and   not a mental state. 
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i.e., as Searle notes in PNC p193 — “the basic intentional relation between the mind 
and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is 
anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those 
intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition 
is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out 
that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Hence, the famous comment by W 
from PI p217 — “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to 
see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the image its    
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation 
(p140 Budd) – “what it always comes to in the end is that without any further 
meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen-and- the 
question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. 
And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. Suppose it 
were asked -do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM (Theory of Mind), or as I prefer UA 
(Understanding of Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 
(i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of Daniel Hutto, 
who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation can be 
involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with 
Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core of the 
burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought 
is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that 
most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in 
the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an 
adequate discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts and commonly 
there is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
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Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows.  
 
It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent 
volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior 
that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with 
hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) 
pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between 
S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, 
knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all 
words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I 
find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking 
about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts 
but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
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conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**        Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly calls this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
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recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow 
deliberative actions that are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or 
false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-
the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same 
words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, 
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there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences and in the brain states), 
and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws, 
which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings 
against theories. This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by Searle, 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in higher 
cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and 
COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all 
S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear 
and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible 
public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-person statements about 
myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about 
others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
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Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an 
incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering 
etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as opposed 
to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness 
and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the 
evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major 
advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state 
public COS for) events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and 
volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain 
processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- 
Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event 
occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out 
in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
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investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of 
the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) 
(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
- DMS) the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in 
PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self 
Reflexive--Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality 
over which no control is possible). 
 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
(represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
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Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as 
language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature, 
Memories, Remembering: (X was true). 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature  
 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects). 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
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rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank 
Slate or the Standard Social Science Model--SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of 
objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed 
by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the 
operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in 
evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and 
actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are 
in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
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computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives 
an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott(1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly 
questionable due to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and 
hence nothing. This occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting 
in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of 
this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein 
from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The 
general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of 
the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language 
games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and 
deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy 
edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information 
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until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a 
public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do 
thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. 
Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to 
substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross 
contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called 
UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in 
S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the 
innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought 
which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—i.e., 
Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of 
frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast 
functions). We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain 
works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in 
full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, 
biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to 
our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. 
Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to 
facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and 
reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. This has been 
explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others. 
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As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have 
multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different 
roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense 
first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my 
ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem 
(in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on 
knowledge or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). 
In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of 
saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs 
used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate 
themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or 
future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public 
acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no 
information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” 
or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and 
PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of 
the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock 
after Wittgenstein). 
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Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for 
an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are Hutto, 
DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who have posted most of their work 
free online at www.academia.edu. Baker & Hacker are found in their many joint 
works. The late Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather 
nihilistic interpretation that was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s 
Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” is free on the net and a must read for any 
student of behavior. 
 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of S1 
which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of 
scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism --hereafter CDC—my 
acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many others 
pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in the BBB in the 
30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see the method of science before 
their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science 
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless others since. 
The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal terms is 
incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that the highly 
diverse language games of “causality” can ever be made to apply-even their 
application in physics and chemistry is variable and often obscure (was it gravity or 
the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or all of them that made the apple fall 
and when did the causes start and end)?. But as W said-“now if it is not the causal 
connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us”. However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side as 
usually stated, as his views are much more subtle. One might find it useful to start 
with my reviews of W, S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, DMS, 
Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of causality and the 
philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has hit the 
mark. 
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In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers or 
linguists have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically 
different uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature 
of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as private 
language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which W laid to 
rest ¾ of a century ago. They often excel at ultrafine dissections of language use but 
they miss the realities of how sentences work in everyday life. It is not merely failing 
to see the forest for the trees, but not seeing the tree because of concentrating on 
such detailed descriptions of the bark (e.g., the late Gordon Baker). 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they cite. 
Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly complete 
omission of all the authors I cite here and so of any real framework for behavior. W 
is easily the most widely discussed modern philosopher with about one new book 
and dozens of articles largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his 
own journal “Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds 
that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined and of most behavioral scientists 
except Chomsky, Pinker and a few others. Searle is perhaps next among modern 
philosophers and Read, etc., are very prominent with dozens of books and 
hundreds of articles, talks and reviews. But CDC, other metaphysicians and most 
behavioral researchers ignore them and the thousands who regard their work as 
critically important. Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and 
large of that of modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions 
it has cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, 
perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different. But as W 
insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his 
supersocratic trialogue form had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in 
my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as simple as 
pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we 
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all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ 
then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box could contain a 
different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private language that only I can 
know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it 
cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruther’s ISA theory of 
mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have 
explained W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional 
language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and 
several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations” 
(2004) and my review of it for a nice explanation of Private Language and 
everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self. The very 
act of writing, reading and all the language and concepts of anything whatsoever 
presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- contradictory 
cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact on the daily life of 
anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person point of view is just 
not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a third person one, but absence of 
coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. Likewise, with the description 
of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- 
well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of 
many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and 
hopeless but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like this. There 
is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior and then the 
experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with human behavior 
combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious automatisms of S1 
(absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that self, will, and 
consciousness are illusions, though of course they think they are showing us the 
‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That is, S2 is 
‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of S1. See e.g., 
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my review of Carruther’s recent ‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
 
But, if someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken 
or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described as 
having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we must 
regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent) but irrelevant to how we 
use language and how we live, which should be regarded as the point from which 
to begin and end such discussions. 
 
And, perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the problems 
of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-not Quine, 
Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I consider 
here). We want to understand how the brain (or the universe) does it but S2 is not 
up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t 
‘know’ but our DNA does courtesy of the death of trillions of organisms over some 
3 billion years. We can describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what an 
‘explanation’ should look like. So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly 
describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at “complete” 
knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a description of what neuronal 
pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear what it would mean (COS) to 
have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, 
explanations come to an end somewhere. 
 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruthers’ “Opacity of 
Mind” (the major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds of 
others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of our 
higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given a quite 
different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no reasons for action, 
only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary problems by trying to 
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answer questions that have no clear sense. It should strike us that these views have 
absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of their adult life 
promoting them.  
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard Problem 
of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and more remote, the 
more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and perception and 
intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced if we face up to it as a 
‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, embodied in a context 
(inextricably natural and social) at a given time, etc…then it can become perspicuous 
to one that there is no problem. Only when one starts, say, to  ‘theorize’ information 
across human and non-human domains (supposedly using the non- human-the 
animal {usually thought of as mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and 
thus getting things back to front), does it begin to look as if there is a problem…that 
all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push 
further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem is the very 
thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has 
ever been given for us to think that there must be a science of something if it is to be 
regarded as real. 
 
There is no good reason to think that there should be a science of consciousness, or 
of mind or of society, any more than there need be a science of numbers, or of 
universes or of capital cities or of games or of    constellations or of objects whose 
names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as 
embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as   brains with 
minds ‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help 
us bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and 
when it is really present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when 
our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our machines 
are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no such thing as getting 
an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard problem is insoluble, 
…Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been defined…’transcendental 
naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive indefinitely of the problem. It offers the 
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extraordinary psychological satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ 
statement of limits to the understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a 
privileged elite, that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what 
Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be 
drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply 
nonsense.” 
 
And many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 82 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the ‘limits 
of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and that we 
should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language(mind) in the fact that we 
cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except by repeating the 
sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 1931). I also find it useful 
to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition is nothing but belief in the causal 
nexus” --written almost a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
 
And again, so apropos here is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical problems). 
The first ‘innocent’ step in the discussion is the fatal one as it commits us to an 
incoherent point of view. To paraphrase W, Carruthers talks about processes and 
states but leaves their nature open.  Later we will figure them out, but this is what 
commits us to a particular way of looking at things and a solution never 
materializes. So, he has to deny ‘mind’, ‘self’, ‘will’. ‘consciousness’ etc. 
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a person who 
forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as we do! Also 
relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all scientific questions have been 
answered, nothing is left to question, and that is itself the answer. And central to 
understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to scientism not science) failures of CDC et al 
is his observation that it is a very common mistake to think that something must make 
us do what we do, which leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the 
mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is 
labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of 
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insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and   reason. 
 
“We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain 
of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
And likewise, he has commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there 
is no reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ 
oneself by working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being 
told the answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and 
‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout all behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is often 
no hint that there are other points of view—that many of the most prominent 
philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also the fact (seldom 
mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, reduction does not 
stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be extended (and has often been) 
to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. 
What exactly should make neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks 
generated the idea that nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the 
universe as a giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the 
history of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton 
in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, 
behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books in 
the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive commentary on 
his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W realized one has to work 
on oneself—self therapy via long hard working through of ‘perspicuous examples’ 
of language (mind) in action. 
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An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy it is 
to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James Jeans 
long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great 
machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘cause’, ‘event’, ‘happen’, ‘occur’, 
’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in science or philosophy as in 
daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in at random with many new ones 
so there is the appearance of sense without sense. Much of academic discussion of 
behavior, life and the universe is high comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of 
most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., comedy dealing with polite society, 
characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot-(see 
Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time-done rightly, it is the best way 
to spend time. How else can we understand our mental life and the higher order 
thought of System 2--the most intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s examples 
describing how our innate psychology uses the testing of System 2 to build on the 
certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and as societies acquire a world view 
of irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on the bedrock of our axiomatic 
genetically programmed reflexive perception and action to the amazing edifice of 
science and culture. The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long 
ago from something that could be challenged to certainties that can only be 
modified, and at the other end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out 
that there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is incoherent. 
We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human understanding 
and the most basic document on our psychology. Though written when in his 60’s, 
mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant as his other work and 
transforms our understanding of philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher 
order thought), bringing it at last into the light, after two thousand years in the cave. 
Metaphysics has been swept away from philosophy and from physics. 
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“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough”—Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
So, this is the general framework I think is essential to all description of higher order 
thought including philosophy, linguistics, pragmatics, semantics, psychology, 
anthropology, law, literature, political science, history, sociology etc. It is also clear 
that the differentiation of these disciplines is somewhat arbitrary, especially 
pragmatics and semantics which are, by and large, meaningless or at best useless 
terms. It is defensible that one might subtitle 
this work ‘Developments of Wittgenstein’s Contextualism’, but of course this term 
has inevitably been corrupted by philosophers. One might then say that pragmatics 
and semantics are parts of or coextensive with epistemology and ontology and the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought (Searle’s Logical Structure of 
Rationality) or that they describe how we use noises in specific contexts to give them 
meaning --i.e., a true or false (propositional) use which Searle calls their Conditions 
of Satisfaction. 
 
